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Art: Farangis G. Yegane

Texts: Gita Yegane Arani and Lothar Yegane Arani (Prenzel)

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
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
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Segregation

“Segregation” in terms of Nonhumans and Humans implies segregated ethics, segregated subjectivity, segregated attributions, segregated environmental comprehension.



Always oppressive specifics

What if it's really illusionary to heal one evil by applying another evil? Like trying to fight an -ism

while (or with) sustaining another -ism – maybe inadvertently?


We don't need/see/want an antisexist society where birds are still being objectified as food.

Any -ism ... has its own specifics. Being against all neg. '-isms', implies acknowledging their cases.



Antidiscriminatory Animal Sociology (1)

A socially just sociology means implying antidiscriminatory animal sociology. The levels of interaction between all subjects and all varying subjectivity need to be focused.



Thinking and Objectification

Thinking and sense-giving and sense-perception

No, you do not accept a radical multiplicity in being. For you there is only one being that thinks. You do not locate thinking in any other being.

At what boundary do you determine when thinking should have been in just one being, a hominid?

And how did this thinking have to express itself? And what did this thinking have to lead to, what was the striving of this thinking?

And why do you determine that you cannot and do not want to perceive thinking in other living beings ‘as thinking’?

Why do you not want to accept the thinking of others as thinking? What is it about their thinking that you think isn’t thinking?

If a squirrel collects nuts, and buries kernels in the process, because she is also trying to spread the seed of the tree, you don’t want to see this as such an think: “No, animals don’t think anything really – they just don’t think.”

How do you know since when on which living being does not think or does think: do you think thinking must always find a certain expression, always lead into certain directions and to certain results? Why can you simply not accept thinking that is different, beyond ‘your thinking about thinking’ in your intellects world?

Among humans, you accept diversity probably only out of your fundamental existential “conformity-thinking” that you tie to your genetics.

Beyond that there is nothing. You think that everything that is thinking in self-advancement, must first have a human and humanoid form and development.

You have appropriated the concept of “thinking” in a sad, all-suppressing and horrific way, and you are using it to impose your “sense”, your sense of meaning, in those places where you think.

Thinking > sense-making and sense-perception.



Speciesism in Art and Veganism (1)

Speciesism and spectacle:

The display of a speciesist act
of harming or killing,
to desensitize onlookers
– lessons in ‘human might’

The nofun facts about (technical and self-declared) “vegans“ where I live: a not inconsiderable number of “vegans” where I live consciously and quite ignorantly associate themselves with the Nitsch-Scene. A little big reminder: supporting or tolerating speciesist art is as little compatible with veganism as is visiting zoos or supporting other forms of [objectifying, speciesist] exploitation. Even if arts don’t exactly fit in the category of ‘entertainment’ since it is defines as “high culture”, no matter in which area or in which spectacle nonhumans are being degraded, vegans should in fact technically not partake in the support of such ventures and sustaining networks, enterprises or cultural institutions, etc.

A friend in Austria had the similar problem of encountering this ethical omission and ambiguity in her local vegan community. We definitely have it too in


Germany, especially in some locations. An interesting fact in that context is that you have Nitsch-fans/supporters ranging from the far left to the extreme right. Even that is another aspect fellow vegans should likely be aware of. Speciesism goes across the board, especially aesthetically and intellectually furbished in “high culture”. It’s definitely not okay if vegans seek to omit arts from the social ethical vegan context.

This is basically an issue for vegan sociology.

Killing and Loving Animality (1)

Killing and Loving Animality simultaneously is considered a very human thing.

The problem being: they kill and “love” them at the same time.



Animal objectification and animal-derogative biologism have their specific features in how they create a minimalization of the ‘human’ social horizon.


Gruppe Messel

The problem being: they kill and “love” them at the same time.

> the Rabbits, the Horses, the Piglets, the Calves, the Emus ...

Animal objectification and animal-derogative biologism have their specific features in how they create a minimalization of the ‘human’ social horizon.


Gruppe Messel



Justice together with Animals

Seeking justice isn't an altruistic action. Justice for Nonhumans lays an interest in the principle of meaningful co-existence.

Foremostly it's a mutual enterprise, a mutual necessity and a mutual direct and powerfully contextualizable gain.



The sadder sides of progress

We have a basically sad theory:

Being vegetarian obviously didn't imply that people were ethically „awake“ about nonhuman rights issues, hence veganism emerged from vegetarianism, with the expressed goal to cover more interests of nonhumans.

Saying that I must add that I can't speak about all (maybe even individual) forms of nonviolent plant-based (...) lifestyles here, which people practiced, but which aren't known or covered by „vegetarian history“.

The vegan movement either isn't an automatic guarantee that Animal Rights issues are adequately addressed. For instance, excluding the question of injustice, while eliminating the level of faunacide (or theriocides) on the levels of

predominantly nonhuman-mass-murder-in-agriculture, means the killing and the violence do not take place at those spaces, yet still, the general and very fundamental justice isn't enacted, as an political and ethical process and societal development from the side of the human societies: Living becomes a problem in terms of damage caused to the environment, and the own plight and history as ,the nonhuman being/group', that nonhumans experience, will still not matter (enough) as an ongoing strife

Of course the same even goes for Animal Rights definitions and movements themselves: Even Animal Rights – taken as the human movement, as the ideas, not the ,thing itself' – can mean the theory (any given one) might be flawed or insufficient.

There is simply no guarantee for a perfect waterproof label that we can reliably go by, without constant cautiousness > there is still a long way to go, to solidify and carve out the human understanding and recognition of Nonhuman Animal Rights. Nevertheless it clearly, logically and assumably must have been a struggle within human communal life and intra-human encounters since the onset of human existence.

Saying that and coming back to the title of this comment we must say that the undifferentiated enthusiasm, evoked by new paths in society to „create a better world“ ...

a.) must still be seen in forefront of the historical and cultural discourses which are relevant here

and

b.) the present dominant settings, that evoke our enthusiasm are, in terms of Animal Rights, definitely not that what the ,history of vegetarianism' and veganism might sum up and presuppose as guaranteed and inseparable implicit parts of their approaches.

It's time that Animal Rights are independent and working far more differentiated that they do now, and Animal Rights must be far more radically outspoken. It's time to very directly contextualize all upcoming relevant angles and perspectivities, so that no more sidetracks will become main evasive paths.

See in this context:

Antibiologistic Antispeciesist Animal Sociology: Environment and Nonhuman Animals, Edition Farangis: Animal Autonomy E-Reader Jahrgang 2, Nr. 2, Oktober 2020, ISSN 2700-693X > <https://d-nb.info/1219413275/34> > <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020101117270152025827>

Antibiologistic Antispeciesist Animal Sociology: Environment and Nonhuman Animals (2). No Nonhuman Animal is an Agricultural Issue, Edition Farangis: Animal Autonomy E-Reader Jahrgang 2, Nr. 3, Oktober 2020, ISSN 2700-693X > <https://d-nb.info/1219686662/34> > <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020101513222074856579>



Social Animal Portrayals (1)

Social Animal Portrayals:

Today's environmentalism tends to reduce nonhuman animals to the calculability of a pictogram.

The questions raised by nonhuman animal issues are dealt with as a concern of ecological biopolitics.

What goes beyond the mutual symbioses of flora and fauna is not being seen in its deep ramifications as contexts of meaningfulness for nonhuman life itself.

Thus the hegemony of definition is maintained, by the goal of “saving earth” for “our” future. The human future. It’s not automatically everyone’s future.

The political approaches for finding common solutions to intra-human conflicts, will have to choose a different perspectivity as a starting point.

In fact, in our opinion, it is somewhat insensitive to believe that the cause of animals is easily helped by analogy comparisons,

by not only comparing or relating the suffering, oppression, etc., that humans experience through humans, with the suffering of the human oppression of animals – which, in the overall context, first of all experience a fundamental negation by humanity – alone,

but by confusing two different political-ethical problems and the resulting catastrophes for the affected as “similar”.

We should be able to realize, without a far too crude recourse to the lamentable chain of human -isms, what it really means for animals and for us when animals are and have been just completely and perpetually objectified by definition in quite nameable, specific ways, by humans.

A conservative analogism is that many people generally think the comparison “we are treated ‘like animals’” or “this person is as cruel ‘an an animal’/this is something ‘only animals do’”, can always be employed by people as needed to contrast the criterion of ‘humanity’ with a negative of ‘animalness’ and ‘being an animal’. Conservative analogism involves omitting the actual situation and interest of animals in one way or the other.

But as far as the more progressive side is concerned: With a more intersubjective and fairer approach, a blanket statement such as: “we share the same suffering” should first be questioned more closely in its justification. We would not consider such a statement to be a sufficient expression of solidarity. Because: If we move to a more just level, human intersubjectivity with animals would indeed mean that humans are able to really put things into relation and thus break the spell of discrimination – by making the situation of the counterpart (the animal victims/of animals as affected by human destructiveness) in this case really understandable for humans as being of a far more severe nature.

How can a human being assume that the concrete things done to animals by humans would have a lesser consequence for animals than if the same thing happened to humans?

If I compare myself with animals, quasi intersubjectively, and then come to the conclusion that we experience the same among humans in this human-determined world, then this is simply not fair to animals and does not represent the real events and the real history known to us.

And whether an intersubjectivity that contains so many discrepancies is an optimal way of approach, since there are still a number of other and perhaps more clear-sighted ways, we would like to put at this point as a question in the room.



Knowing things, while being undifferentiated

The relegation of “the main thing is being for the animals” into the corner, to which one assigns this title, distracts from the fact that the formulation “mainly for the animals” (a freely floating ‘inner trend’ of certain segments of groups dealing with animal topics) actually only represents a superficial consideration of the question.

The question whether “mainly for the animals” is ethically okay or problematic is in our opinion wrongly posed and inconsistently thought, because:

How is the animal question posed at all? In such a way that here actually nothing at all is about animals: since the specifics of their problem are suppressed.

The state we're currently in

Why should animal concerns be discussed solely in the subjects hitherto assigned to them, rather than in a *debiologized attitude* towards them? "Being a human being" is conceived as a sociological condition, while non-human animals and animality per se are put into categories of a (supposed and causalistically imagined) "behavioral-biological" dominatedness.

- *Animality* can be viewed in a *debiologized* manner
- Respecting existential diversity implies that broader perspectives than the *solely anthropocentric* are necessary
- Understanding existential diversity, which includes humans and non-human animals, as a "we" means: we can learn from each other, as *social beings* and as *living beings understandable in ecological contexts*

See on the 'specificity of the problem', and on the question of a critical and at the same time affirmative reorientation of Anthropos:

Ko, Syl/Johnson, Lindgren (2021). Re-centering the Human. TIERAUTONOMIE, 8 (2), <https://d-nb.info/1234872005/34> > <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021060613534776089875>

The question of who and what Anthropos is – a question of plurality – needs to be asked again, no matter what.

How to deal with all the associations, against whose background animal rights activism etc. is always to be considered:

With so much existent opportunism – which has nothing to do with animal rights, but with the people – parts of the animal-issue-serving movements will always fractionate with all kinds of questionable sides. More clout for half-baked ideas and entirely different agendas. Less plurality.



The „Neverunderstanding“ – or simply the last layer of Animal Objectification?

LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION, Animal Sociology and Animal Objectification

You can read this as hate speech, because it is.

Some people, or many or most people are simply not willing to quit applying either: biologism or a detouring language about possible intersocial perspectives and lived experiences in regards to Nonhumans and the problematics they are facing.

The subject

as a ‘social unit’

overcomes the category of species

> perspective of interest > Yarbrough > how did the concept or species arise ...

“Race and species are arbitrary distinctions that arose around the same time in European thought. They are both driven by phenotypic differences but carry the weight and legitimacy as though they are biologically rooted, and biological is often associated with “fixed.” In biology, the biological species definition is considered the ultimate species definition. If groups are shown to have individuals producing reproductively viable offspring, then they are truly a species. More often than not, this primary definition is too difficult to test in the field or in the lab, so other definitions based on morphological and phylogenetic differences between groups are considered an acceptable substitution. But what the morphological and phylogenetic species definitions do is make the labeling of species just as arbitrary as race theory. For both, it basically comes down to: if you look a little different, do things a little differently, vary somewhat genetically, and even live in a different region from the basis of comparison, that’s good enough to label your group a distinct species (and historically, race and species have been used interchangeably) until some other “expert” comes along and says otherwise.” YARBROUGH, Anastasia: *White supremacy and patriarchy hurts animals*, 2015, talk held at first Sistah Vegan conference (German translation >

E-Reader: Gruppe Messel, Jahrgang 2, Nr. 4, S. 3, 2020, <https://d-nb.info/1215819366/34>, we will archive the original English version, which so far is published on our website at <https://www.simorgh.de/objects/yarbrough-white-supremacy-and-patriarchy-hurt-animals/> at the DNB too.)

Again, on whichever foot you wish to put it:

The subject as a ‘social unit’ overcomes the category of species; so I call the encounter (direct and indirect, contextualized) inter-social and speak of inter-social contexts between ‘social units’.

As ‘subjects’ we go into a form a ‘social’ exchange and encounter. Mind: the setting of encounter and thus contextualization can be seen either in contexts that apply a human-hegemonic claim, or it can be different than that ... leaving open space.

The notion of species is a biologism. And yes: Life is obviously manifold.

We act as if the only form of objectifying and defining bodies and lives which categorically never implies biologism, is when we come to talk about and act in regards to Nonhumans and Nonhuman Natural Entities.

We at least agree to understand many Nonhuman lives as “living entities/organisms”).

We pour the baby out with the water when it comes to differentiation. That we cannot avoid any harm and that we are far from a legislative logic that sees Animal Subjects and Earth Rights, etc. does not mean we can just keep drawing the old line of some idea of human hegemony and nonhuman disposability.

Biologism:

“Biology and ethology have somehow become the sciences of animalkind. It is from these sciences that social scientists (the sciences of humankind) uncritically and largely unwittingly derive their own image of animals and animalness. Animals have become associated with biological and genetic explanations.” NOSKE, Barbara, The Animal Question in Anthropology: A Commentary, Society and Animals 1 (2):185-190 (1993), <https://philpapers.org/rec/NOSTAQ> (accessed 17.01.23).

A rhetoric of justice

Try for once to speak about animal issues without biologizing the concrete individual animal subjects or groups or cultures ... , without metaphorizing them, without secundarizing them, without applying degrading frameworks of human enacting some kind of definitory or descriptive hegemony over a realm outside of their helpful and parallel damaging combative ... intra-social interests.

The way in which we shaped our speech about animal issues and about animal subjects/individuals/groups/cultures/contexts ... created and shaped our own image of them. Which is quite disabling in this society.

Unless we learn to speak differently, to critically conceptualize differently, by putting things into perspective, we – basically solely as members of the species “human” – will not be able to grow up to become a valid member of this place we are allowed to live in qua life.

We are not automatically tied to be so conformist, we don't have to stick to an exclusive “human” collectivity and an exclusive idea of forced similarity in our outlooks and understandings ..., and this is why we here are angry and call people responsible for incessantly being incoherent about their aims when they unlock their inner forms of animal oppression and thus keep running around with this extremely thick worldview

Impressum

Edition Farangis
Untergasse 7 / Marstallweg 8
61250 Usingen / Taunus
Deutschland
mail@farangis.de
Tel. + 49 6081 6 88 24 49
www.farangis.de

Autor:innen: Gita Marta Yegane Arani (Tschördy / Palang LY) und Lothar Yegane Arani (Prenzel).

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Herausgeber:innen: Lothar Yegane Arani (Prenzel); Gita Marta Yegane Arani; Edition Farangis

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